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Washington’s Growth and Opportunity Act or Beijing’s ‘Overarching Brilliance’: 
Will African Governments Choose Neither?   
JOANNE E. DAVIES 
(Consultant, African Studies Centre, University of Oxford) 
Abstract: 
Growing criticism of Chinese engagement in Africa centres on the risk to African 
development posed by China’s aggressive export policies and the threat to the 
Washington Consensus and African governance posed by China’s ‘non-interference’ 
approach to engagement.  This article challenges both these assumptions.  The growth 
of Chinese trade has a wide range of impacts, depending on the sector in question, and 
the current terms of trade Washington extends to Africa under the auspices of the 
AGOA do not result in uniformly beneficial effects.  With regard to African 
governance, it is argued that the ‘Washington Consensus’ has been based on 
competing and often muddled perceptions of US national interest.  This fact tempers 
the regret felt at Washington’s loss of influence over the good governance agenda.  
Evidence is provided to show that China can work within properly regulated countries 
and industries, if the African governments in question can provide fair, efficient and 
transparent environments in which to operate.   
 
 
Although much has been written on the threat of China’s power to both the 
Washington Consensus and the future of good governance in Africa, there needs to be 
a clearer understanding of what – if anything – will be lost if American influence is 
undermined on the continent.  The preservation and cultivation of influence is 
significant to the competing interests in Beijing and Washington.  In terms of concrete 
African development, however, the relevance of the competing agendas will be 
lessened unless and until the movement for good governance makes progress in 
Africa itself.  After fifty years of post-independence aid, disillusionment with the 
western model of development assistance has set in among recipients and even some 
donors.  The unhappy truth has been that, for all the carefully constructed tools and 
institutions of the Washington Consensus, it has failed repeatedly to achieve its 
objectives.  From structural adjustment programmes, conditionality, and a focus on 
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governance, none of the programmes or institutions of the western model has yet been 
ultimately successful in improving the lot of ordinary Africans in any durable way.
1
   
 
There has been an explosion of commentary concerning the rise of China in the 
context of Africa’s development agenda.  Battle lines have been drawn between the 
‘Washington Consensus’ and the ‘Beijing Consensus’, with Halper issuing a 
‘…clarion call…that America is engaged in a global struggle to assert and sustain the 
primacy of western values’.2  Meanwhile, Brautigam offers some very persuasive 
arguments as to why the rise of China will not necessarily result in the wholesale 
undermining of western-sponsored African development.  The rise of China presents a 
small window of opportunity.  For the African continent truly to capitalize on this 
new element of competition in the development arena, it is crucial that two specific 
areas are strengthened.  The first of these centres on the use and timing of trade 
preferences.  The second factor focuses on good governance. These two factors are 
examined in tandem in this article as reform in one area will come to very little 
without complementary reform in the other.  Taken together, these two factors will be 
crucial in determining how China’s rise as a world power will impact, not only on the 
African continent, but also on the Washington Consensus model of development and 
on the role of the US in Africa.  Africans should be free to determine which elements 
of which programme are the most useful for their countries and societies – with one 
crucial caveat.  If the western model is rejected in favour of China’s model of 
(politically) illiberal capitalism, will it be a case of African governing elites choosing 
what is in their interest at the cost of their own citizens?  It is important to identify 
what is at stake if the Washington Consensus is overthrown in favour of Beijing’s 
purported ‘non-interference’ approach.   
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This article will examine the impact of both Beijing and Washington on the two areas 
of trade preferences with Africa, and supporting the governance agenda in Africa.  
There is a real urgency surrounding both of these issues because African governments 
at last hold some measure of influence.  They have valuable assets to offer both the 
US superpower and the rising giant of China – each of whom need access to the 
resources of the continent, but both of whom also look to the African continent as one 
source of their diplomatic prestige.  This may be more apparent in Beijing’s 
determined courting of African governments and its insistence on their adherence to 
the ‘One China’ policy, but there is a powerful contingent within the American 
foreign policy making apparatus – and in American society itself – that has not 
abandoned America’s sense of mission, and its firmly held belief in American 
exceptionalism.  The investigation will turn initially to American trade preferences 
towards Africa, and their impact on Africa’s ability to improve domestic 
manufacturing and export diversification.  The focus is on the US African Growth and 
Opportunity Act (AGOA), which represents the type of favourable market access that 
African governments and development specialists have long been requesting.  This is 
then followed by an analysis of the threats – or opportunities – that the rise of China 
might pose in this area.  
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Part I   
The US, China and African Trade 
 
Seizing the day: The AGOA and the impact of trade preferences 
As western economies contracted in the wake of the global economic crash, the 
developing world faced a sudden evaporation of export markets combined with a 
virtual cessation of capital inflows to Africa in particular.  And yet Kapstein argues 
that, in ‘one of the great ironies of history’, Africa could emerge from the global 
recession as the only region that remains committed to global capitalism.
3
  This stems 
from a realization that one result of the crisis has been an increase in protectionism.  
Over recent decades the goal of trade liberalization has proved successful, in that 
tariffs on goods have declined from a worldwide average of over 25 per cent in 1980 
to less than ten per cent today.
4
  Unfortunately, reports from both the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and the World Bank warn that trade barriers are once again on 
the rise.  Since October 2008, 66 restrictive trade measures have been proposed and 
47 have been enacted, including India’s ban on Chinese toys (although proposed ‘Buy 
American’ legislation has since been aborted).5  Protectionism reduces trade and 
imposes costs on those who instigate it, but for Africa, with its small domestic 
markets, the rise of protectionism through increased trade barriers to developed 
country markets is ‘potentially deadly’.6 
 
There is a small ray of hope with regard to these trade barriers.  In The Bottom Billion, 
Collier identifies export diversification as being a significant factor in promoting 
African growth.  Competing globally in an export market, rather than in domestic 
monopolies, really does improve the productivity of African firms, but the problem 
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remains how to get these firms over the initial starting ‘hump’ of competitiveness.  
Collier argues that initially what Africa needs is temporary protection from Asia.  
This policy, in which Asia rather than the West bears this burden of aiding African 
development, is politically (and morally) problematic, but the crucial word here is 
‘temporary’.  Collier certainly does not argue that the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) should therefore raise tariffs against Asia, rather 
that tariffs against competing products from Africa should be removed.  This would 
go some way in addressing their lack of economies of scale, problems with 
infrastructure and lack of a skilled workforce.  An important caveat is that this is a 
time-limited window of opportunity for Africa.  By approximately 2015, OECD 
tariffs against Asia would no longer be high enough for there to be much scope for 
protecting Africa.
7
  However, although the opportunity might be narrow, it is hoped 
that the temporary nature of this solution would increase its potency in two ways: 
making it more acceptable to the Asian countries whose tariffs would temporarily 
remain in place; and focusing the minds of African policy makers who would have to 
structure policies and improve governance in order to facilitate the diversification of 
their exports in the time frame offered.   
 
African manufacturers were given this very opportunity by Washington under the 
auspices of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which was signed into 
law under the Clinton administration in May 2000.  The scheme provides selected 
African countries with the most liberal access to American markets available to any 
country with which the US does not have a Free Trade Agreement.  It initially proved 
to be a useful tool with which to respond to the increasing disenchantment with the 
Washington Consensus development model.  In its early days, the AGOA scheme 
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provided some tangible benefits to eligible African countries, especially in the area of 
textile and garment exports, but also in certain agricultural areas, for example, the 
exporting of cut flowers.  The AGOA was greeted with enthusiasm in Africa, 
particularly in the way that it represented a shift in the old development thinking away 
from conditional aid packages to something Africans themselves had been requesting 
for a long time – a more explicit focus on trade and market access to enhance their 
growth.   
 
The figures for African exports to the US of both textiles and clothing in the first five 
years of the AGOA demonstrate how this sector in particular boomed.  This situation 
was enhanced by the fact that the Multi Fibre Agreement (MFA) was still in place.  
The MFA was enacted in 1974 in order to protect the developed world’s textile and 
garment manufacturers from developing world exports through a system of quotas on 
what the developing world could export.  It was instigated because of concern in the 
West that the labour intensive nature of this sector would give the developing world a 
natural advantage due to their low labour costs.  The MFA acted as a barrier to Asian 
textile exports to the developed world, during which time African exporters we able to 
build up their exporting base, supported by the AGOA.  Overall, sub-Saharan Africa’s 
apparel exports grew by 130 per cent between the enacting of the AGOA in 2000 and 
the expiry of the Multi Fibre Agreement on 1
st
 January 2005.  Particular beneficiaries 
during this period were: Kenya (a 529 per cent increase in textile and clothing exports 
to the US); Swaziland (a 455 per cent increase); Malawi (276 per cent); and Lesotho 
(225 per cent).  The combination of AGOA’s favourable entry rates and the blocking 
of Asian competition via the MFA combined to provide remarkably favourable 
conditions for African exports, but the timing of this opportunity was brief.  When 
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such opportunities do arise, it is crucial that African governments enact policies and 
streamline bureaucracy in a manner which would support the restructuring of their 
industries during these boom times in order for them to remain competitive in a more 
open market.  This they failed to do in this instance, but the fault did not lie solely 
with them.   
 
The benefits of the AGOA to African exporters have been tangible, but there are a 
number of significant limitations which have stymied any real embedding of these 
gains.  The first of these reflects problems with the structure of the AGOA itself.  A 
vital aspect of this system is the time scale.  AGOA waivers are only granted for one 
year at a time, and the AGOA itself is only guaranteed for three years.  It is simply not 
possible for African industries to make long term investment and planning decisions 
predicated on market access which could prove only (very) temporary.  There is a 
further structural problem within the AGOA: the Rules of Origin (ROO) component.  
These ROOs dictate how much value the imported constituents used in the final 
export can contribute to the overall value of the product.  If the rules are too tight, 
they can negate any potential benefit for African exporters: for example, a Kenyan 
garment with a Chinese zip attached could be made ineligible for preferential access if 
ROOs are not sufficiently fine tuned to allow for this.  On the other hand, if the ROOs 
prove too lax, any Chinese product could pass though an African country with a 
‘made in Namibia’ label on it, once again nullifying the intended benefits for the 
African exporter.
8
   Despite these issues, the AGOA initially proved to be of real 
assistance in the growth of African textile and garment manufacturing.  The whole 
enterprise, however, has resulted in an empirical example of Collier’s warning – the 
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fact that this window of opportunity is brief.  For certain critics, the culpability for 
slamming that window shut lies firmly with China.   
 
African trade: the case against China 
Although Beijing has endeavoured to present itself as a ‘development partner’ to 
Africa, concern has been growing with regard to the negative impact Chinese exports 
have had on African trade.  When the MFA was dismantled in 2005, the playing field 
was levelled once more, and the result was a big surge in competition in this export 
market, with Chinese exports to the United States being a particular problem.  This 
direct competition led to a wave of job losses across southern Africa in the sector that 
had grown as a direct result of the favourable provisions of the AGOA.  In Lesotho 
28.9 per cent of the clothing sector workforce lost their jobs, in South Africa the 
figure stood at 12 per cent of the total employed, and in Swaziland the figure reached 
a catastrophic 56.2 per cent.  In these three countries alone, this translated into 45,000 
job losses in the clothing sector.
9
  African trade unions have blamed China for 
damaging African manufacturing, with Nigerian trade unions blaming Chinese 
imports for the loss of 350,000 jobs across all sectors in Nigeria alone.
10
  So intense 
was the criticism from African press and trade unions that the Chinese were prompted 
to implement a two year self-imposed quota system at the beginning of 2007 to allow 
the African textile industry time to adjust.  This example illustrates both the efficacy 
of preferential market access in helping African sectors to grow, but also how fragile 
the benefits of these limited conditions can be.   
 
The growing criticism of China in Africa does not focus solely on the threat posed by 
competition from Chinese exports.  Union movements and commentators alike are 
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now also beginning to accuse China of a ‘recolonization’ of Africa.  A number of 
studies have predicted that China’s method of doing business is set to repeat the old 
trading patterns whereby Africa’s primary products and raw commodities will be 
exchanged for finished manufactured goods from Asia.
11
  Business Day reported the 
International Textile, Garment and Leather Workers Federation’s Africa chapter as 
stating: ‘Increasingly, the trade pattern between the African continent and China is 
becoming colonial in character, with African countries exporting raw materials to 
China and importing finished products’.12  This accusation is reiterated in the West, 
where China’s intent is often characterized as a malign plan to establish control over 
Africa’s natural resources – to the detriment of the West.  The World Bank reports 
that the majority of projects in sub-Saharan Africa funded by Beijing ‘…are 
ultimately aimed at securing a flow of sub-Saharan Africa’s natural resources for 
export to China’.13  A report by the European Parliament also asserts that Chinese 
interest in Africa, and its aid disbursements, are limited to resource-rich countries 
only, bypassing other African nations.
14
  It is certainly true that China’s rapid growth 
has resulted in a pressing need for increased imports of natural resources, but further 
analysis undermines the growing belief in a Beijing-orchestrated master plan focused 
on transferring the natural resources of the African continent back to China.  In fact, 
China does not bypass any African country with which it has good diplomatic 
relations: ‘China gives aid to every single country in sub-Saharan Africa that follows 
the One China policy’.15  In addition to this, it is important to note that China does not 
only concentrate its investment in raw material extraction.  Brautigam argues that, 
while resources matter, China’s approach is about generating business, with the 
Chinese involved in a whole range of sectors.  She quotes a Nigerian diplomat in 
Beijing who explained: ‘The Chinese are trying to get involved in every sector of our 
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economy.  If you look at the West, it’s oil, oil, oil, and nothing else’.  With regard to 
the idea that Beijing is orchestrating this resource exploitation, researchers argue that 
it is individual Chinese companies, who enjoy considerable freedom of manoeuvre, 
who are in the vanguard of this activity.  In fact, these companies are under no 
obligation to export their oil back into China, and they can sell it to wherever they can 
get the highest price.  As a Chinese mining supervisor explains: ‘China is so far away, 
expensive to get to.  I would rather just deliver the money’.16 
 
A number of further considerations are making Africans question whether their initial 
indiscriminate enthusiasm for Chinese involvement was misplaced.  The huge influx 
of Chinese companies means that some of China’s own low standards of employment 
are also being imported along with the Chinese workforce.
17
  It should be noted that 
many African companies, particularly small to medium-sized operations, also have a 
well-established record of flouting employment laws, but the sheer scale of Chinese 
involvement has helped to maintain a downward pressure on both wages and workers’ 
rights.  In addition to these factors, Taylor points to the issue of Chinese intellectual 
theft, whereby Chinese immigrants are copying traditional African designs – 
particularly in the textile market – manufacturing them from cheap materials, and then 
undercutting the indigenous manufacturers and the traders at the local markets.
18
  It is 
clear that the rapid nature of China’s engagement has brought a number of negative 
consequences to the African continent.  Throughout the continent, however, the 
impact of Chinese trade on individual African countries and sectors is not uniform.   
 
 African trade: the case for China 
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It is important to distinguish between both the competitive and complementary 
impacts of Chinese imports and exports.  Some scenarios are synergistic: for countries 
producing goods that Africa exports and China imports there will be a significant 
gain.  This largely refers to the hard commodity and oil exporters such as Nigeria, 
Angola, Zambia, Sudan and South Africa.  Likewise, for those products that China 
exports and Africa imports, there is benefit.  Many basic consumer goods and some 
capital goods are now within the reach of many Africans who would have previously 
not been able to purchase them.  However, in sectors where both China and Africa 
compete to export, Africa will find itself at a significant disadvantage.  The negative 
impact of the fierce competition in clothing and textiles was demonstrated – as we 
have seen – with the dismantling of the MFA in 2005.  The impact on employment 
has devastated some areas of the community in Lesotho, Kenya, Madagascar, 
Mauritius, South Africa and Swaziland.  A disadvantageous scenario will also arise in 
sectors where both China and Africa compete to import the same goods.  This is 
especially the case with hard commodities – most particularly oil – and African 
importers will be certain to suffer from the upward pressure on world prices caused by 
China’s soaring demand.19   
 
As these varied impacts show, it is possible to forward a more balanced approach to 
what the rise of China might mean.  Ngaire Woods quotes an OECD study which 
concludes that there is some evidence that countries with increased trade and aid links 
with China have higher growth rates, better terms of trade, increased export volumes 
and higher public revenues.
20
  There also appears to be less of a disconnect between 
China’s aid and trade policies.  Alden identifies these factors as reflecting China’s 
‘carefully constructed foreign policy of ‘rayonnement’, or ‘overarching brilliance’.21  
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In a short space of time, China has successfully matched the western development 
actors, and has framed its cooperation in terms of solidarity.  In South Africa, for 
example, a sharp rise in Chinese clothing imports has been blamed for the crisis in 
that country’s clothing industry.  The Chinese response has been to fund a US$2.5 
million training programme in South Africa’s garment industry, and to promise 
preferential loans to assist the modernization of the textile industry.
22
  This aspect of 
policy in particular has been well received in the recipient countries.  It is also 
possible that China’s aid and investment can provide the right conditions for Africa’s 
‘take off’:  
Chinese factories offer not only jobs – they also use production technologies 
that African entrepreneurs can easily adopt…African elites keep some 40 per 
cent of their wealth outside the continent, far more than the Asian average of 
only 6 per cent.  Chinese firms…could offer incentives for some of that wealth 
to return to a capital-starved region.
23
 
Beijing’s rejection of the former colonizing powers’ patronizing approach to Africa, 
together with its inclusion of a significant trade and investment programme, 
demonstrates that it intends China’s role as donor to contrast with the donors of the 
West: a ‘silent revolution’ in development assistance. 24 
 
The Washington Consensus was being questioned even before the global economic 
crisis hit.  The system of Anglo Saxon free-market capitalism was being challenged as 
a reflection of western excesses that was neither sustainable nor possible for recipient 
governments to follow.  This was in contrast to the relatively insulated Chinese 
economy which appears to offer hope as a model to developing countries today.  As 
China gradually responds to the varied criticisms of its policies, there are times when 
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it looks more like a development partner to those recipient African government with 
which it engages.  Its willingness to listen and adapt on areas such as worker rights 
and safety, its funding of ventures run solely by African entrepreneurs through the use 
of the China-Africa Development Fund, its tougher stance towards Harare and 
Khartoum and its increased willingness to cooperate with the United Nations and the 
WTO all indicate that Chinese foreign policy is about more than creating a league of 
dictators with the sole aim of securing natural resources at the expense of the West.  
For as long as a belief in American exceptionalism persists, however, any evidence of 
the benign nature of certain elements of Chinese engagement will hold little comfort.  
Improved economic circumstances in Africa are clearly desirable, but not necessarily 
at the cost of Washington’s influence.   
 
Part II 
The US, China and African Governance 
 
The Chinese threat to good governance 
China’s rapid rise as a significant actor in the arena of African development prompted 
much concern in Washington in particular, with observers damning its interference in 
the strongest possible terms.  China’s toxic aid was, it was argued, about to undermine 
all the years of careful progress that had been nurtured by the Washington model of 
conditional assistance.  Kagan warned that China’s policy of non-interference in the 
domestic affairs of recipient states was amounting to an ‘informal league of dictators’.  
Well-documented dealings with the brutal regime of al-Bashir in the Sudan and 
China’s funding of controversial patrol boats in the delta region of Nigeria have all 
been reasonable grounds for concern in the West.   
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Within Africa too, China has been heavily criticised for its lack of transparency and 
disregard for human rights which some argue has led directly to maintenance of 
dictators in power, and the avoidance of true development.
25
  It is not difficult to see 
why dictators might welcome some of China’s actions, even while they are rejected 
by African civil society.  Certainly, China’s initial pride in its ‘no strings attached’ 
development assistance was most appealing to African leaders, who had become 
accustomed to sitting through lectures from their western donors.  A resurgence of 
support for the ‘prestige projects’ beloved by so many African dictators over the years 
demonstrated that China’s contribution could turn back the western good governance 
agenda in Africa.  Washington became increasingly concerned as more African states 
managed to use Chinese aid in order to sidestep the institutions which are the 
foundation stones of the Washington Consensus.   Negotiators at the IMF watched in 
frustration as their carefully crafted 2005 loan to Angola, which included conditions 
on the reform of the government, was abandoned by the Angolan government in 
favour of a huge package of soft loans from China.  There was a similar story in Chad 
when a World Bank loan, negotiated to include some significant poverty reduction 
measures, was scrapped in light of alternative assistance from China.  The proposed 
Mpanda Nkuwa dam in Mozambique was greeted with concern by many stakeholders 
in Mozambique, but the environmental and social concerns could be overlooked by 
the government when the Chinese agreed to step in and provide funding.   
 
Initially, the Chinese government was perfectly happy to weather the criticism, 
because they were determined to maintain a policy of non-interference.  As 
Pambazuka reported, Chinese diplomats were proud to announce: ‘Non-intervention 
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is our brand, like intervention is the Americans’ brand’.26  Politically illiberal China 
provides an example of notable economic success, ‘which stands in stark contrast to 
the prescriptions of the Washington Consensus’27 and could leave Washington with 
significantly reduced leverage on the African continent.    Indeed, a lack of 
ideological zeal has been one of China’s greatest assets in its meteoric rise in 
development circles.  The wisdom of Deng Xiaoping’s recommendation that China’s 
foreign policy should include a focus on ‘…maintaining a low profile, [and] never 
claim[ing] leadership…’ stands in contrast to the often clumsy and sometimes 
counterproductive attempts of the West, and the US in particular, to champion its own 
ideological vision through its development assistance.
28
 
 
Advocates of the Washington Consensus model, however, warn that far worse 
outcomes will result if the western model of development assistance is replaced by a 
‘Beijing Consensus’ holding sway in Africa.29  Washington’s argument was that the 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs) had come some way in pursuing their 
carefully constructed ‘good governance’ agenda and that the conditionality 
underpinning many of the development programmes was crucial in strengthening 
support for this goal.  In fact, the Chinese have found it necessary to step back from 
their trumpeted policy of non-interference, most notably on the Sudan and Zimbabwe.  
Beijing has grown increasingly sensitive to the criticism levelled at it by the rest of 
the international community for its dealings with these pariah states, and this has had 
an effect on the direction of its engagement.  Even more to the point, however, was 
the fact that Beijing soon came to realise that doing business with governments that 
were suffering from endemic corruption and instability did not make for good 
investment conditions.  The whole development agenda has become more complex 
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for Beijing as they come to the realization that a basic level of stability and integrity is 
desirable among recipient governments. 
 
The Washington Consensus – what is at risk? 
The Washington Consensus places great emphasis on economic and political freedom.  
The latter, together with an increasing international interest in the notion of human 
rights, and a reignited belief in American exceptionalism, formed the basis of much of 
the later conditionality in aid programmes.  The evangelical approach of the liberal 
internationalists overlapped with the beliefs of the neo-conservatives in the area of 
democracy promotion, if not in the methods to pursue it.  The stumbling of the 
Washington Consensus reflects Vaclav Havel’s argument that practitioners in the field 
of international relations do the greatest harm when they have an unshakable belief 
that they possess universal solutions to the problems of the world.  Many African 
governments would agree with this criticism, remembering from bitter experience the 
negative effects that can result from the blind promotion of a ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
development model being urged onto disparate societies across the continent by their 
influential donors and the powerful multilateral donor organisations.  Over the last 
decade, some African leaders have become more confident to speak out against the 
prevailing development Consensus.  Former Mozambican President Joachim 
Chissano criticised the way in which African concerns on local infrastructure and the 
need to grow the local private sector had been ‘systematically dismissed’ by western 
donors.
30
   
 
A further problem is one that blights every aspect of development policy.  This 
obstacle is represented by the competing agendas within the donor community, and 
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the fact that competing perceptions of national interest will result in conflicting 
priorities in development programmes, many of which have little to do with 
development.  One such example is ‘PD20’, enacted by the US Congress in 1994 to 
prohibit the US Agency for International Development (USAID) from providing any 
funding if it was ‘reasonably likely’ that the result of the funding would lead to any 
job losses in the United States.
31
  This immediately precluded assistance in growing 
local private sectors within recipient economies, which contrasts with China’s 
promise to assist with the modernization of South Africa’s textile industry.  It has 
been the experience of these conflicting agendas which has resulted in so much 
hostility among recipients, made far worse by the fact that such ‘assistance’ is 
accompanied by lectures on good governance.  China’s approach, on the other hand, 
can be summed up in the pithy conclusion of Jeffrey Sachs, when he stated, ‘China 
has a very pragmatic approach.  It gives fewer lectures and more practical help’.32 
 
The continued commitment to American exceptionalism is illustrated in the 
Department of Commerce’s assessment of the AGOA programme, as contained 
within its annual US-African Trade Profile.  Individual African countries have to 
qualify to be accepted as beneficiaries of the scheme, and the Act authorizes the 
President to designate countries as eligible to receive the benefits of AGOA if they are 
determined to have established, or are making continual progress towards establishing 
the following: market-based economies; the rule of law and political pluralism; 
elimination of barriers to U.S. trade and investment; protection of intellectual 
property; efforts to combat corruption; policies to reduce poverty, increasing 
availability of health care and educational opportunities; protection of human rights 
and worker rights; and elimination of certain child labour practices.
33
  These criteria 
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demonstrate that Washington is unwilling to jettison its commitment to conditionality 
in development assistance.  At face value, despite the potential challenge to 
sovereignty posed by such conditionality, it would be hard to argue against the 
beneficial nature of the reforms upon which Washington is insisting.  The pressing 
need to improve African governance is, unarguably, crucial.  It is this belief that has 
led some commentators to lament the rise of China in the development arena and to 
argue that China’s approach will undermine the improvements in African governance 
that are contingent upon Washington’s conditionality.  This presupposes, however, 
that Washington’s conditionality has a proven efficacy in this area. 
 
Much has been made of China’s insatiable resource hunger as being the driving force 
behind its Africa policy.  An examination of the way in which the AGOA is being 
utilized by American importers, however, demonstrates that the roots of this 
development tool appear little different.  Figures for 2008 demonstrate that US 
imports from Africa under the auspices of the AGOA remained highly concentrated 
among a small number of countries, namely Nigeria, Angola, South Africa and the 
Republic of Congo.  (Considering that these four countries accounted for 83.7 per 
cent of US purchases in 2008, this would appear to negate some of the vehement 
criticism levelled at China in its dealings with Angola.  Beijing’s soft loan 
unquestionably aided the Angolan government in sidestepping the conditionalities 
required of a major IMF loan, but US imports of Angolan oil also contribute hugely to 
that government’s coffers.)  Resource acquisition is just as significant in US imports 
from Africa as it is to the Chinese, with oil imports accounting for 82.8 per cent of all 
US purchases in 2008.  The second highest US import from the continent was 
platinum, accounting for a further 3.5 per cent.  US investment, too, is heavily 
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concentrated in the extraction of natural resources, with all the implicit problems this 
type of investment brings, often including a skewed economy suffering from Dutch 
disease.  While Washington might lament China’s indiscriminate investment and 
boasts of non-interference, judging by the oil-exporting primary beneficiaries of the 
AGOA, it seems that the boost to good governance provided by the conditionality of 
the AGOA is not particularly beneficial either.   
 
No foreign policy can emerge unscathed from the implementation process.  High 
hopes and laudable donor aspirations of encouraging and cajoling African 
governments away from corruption and mismanagement and towards a transparent 
and efficient state apparatus are always hijacked by myriad national interest 
considerations.  These may be resource-based, economic, political or cloaked in terms 
of national security, but they must always be taken into account when assessing the 
likely impact of any policy.  The AGOA, for example, looks like a useful and (the 
crucial point) mutually beneficial instrument for growth.  It addresses some of the 
issues that the African governments have been calling for for decades, for example, 
the re-prioritizing of trade and investment over Washington-centric conditional aid 
handouts.  By the time the development benefits have been watered down by the 
economic considerations of the Department of Commerce, then the challenges in 
Congress, followed by a filtering through the often corrupt structures of the recipient 
government (and sometimes the corrupt structures of the western businesses 
involved), the result is what we see today: a system funded by the American taxpayer 
which mainly facilitates the smooth running of the same exploitative colonial 
relationships of trade – the export of oil, minerals and, particularly after the demise of 
the MFA, unprocessed, non-value added materials.  
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In addition to these factors, the appeal of the West has been further diminished by the 
economic crash, which has called into question the very nature of the model the West 
has been trying to sell.  A good deal of America’s influence has been derived from the 
‘soft power’ of the strength of the brand of market-based capitalism.34  The way in 
which the power of this brand has been undermined by the crash has led to a further 
undermining of US influence.  This has exacerbated trends showing that it is not just 
the American economic model which has suffered damage.  In a wide ranging poll 
conducted by the Pew Research Center in 2007, the approval ratings on ‘American 
Ideas about Democracy’ had fallen almost unanimously across the board since 2002.35  
It has been in this context - the decline of American popularity, the economic crash 
and especially the rise of an alternative donor approach as represented by China - that 
the Washington Consensus has been so badly damaged.   
 
The arguments for supporting the West’s good governance agenda become weaker the 
more scrutiny they undergo.  It would be impossible to argue against the need for 
improvements in African governance, but the programmes put in place to improve 
governance have, all too often, been weak, ineffectual, and undermined by conflicting 
vested interests from donors and recipients alike.  As Brautigam explains, ‘Critics 
described the process as an elaborate charade: aid recipients pretending to reform, and 
donors pretending to believe them’.36   
 
Will African governments squander their chance? 
Criticism of the scale of Chinese growth and investment and its impact on African 
manufacturing and growth has an element of scapegoating to it.  African governments 
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were aware that the provisions of the MFA and the protection it afforded were only 
temporary, yet there is little evidence that they took steps to avoid the inevitable 
ramifications of the post-MFA increase in competition.  China was able to benefit 
hugely from the lifting of these trade restrictions, although some aspects of their 
success are indeed more controversial.  (The fact that the Yuan has long been 
undervalued by up to 40 per cent has been a source of international contention.)  
However, Beijing also utilized more positive measures to ensure that Chinese 
manufacturing would thrive in the open markets.  The Chinese government provided 
its textile industry with billions of dollars worth of ‘free capital, direct and indirect 
subsidies, and a host of other “incentives” to drive competitors out of the markets’.37  
It would be unrealistic to suggest that African governments were in a position to offer 
a similar level of support to their domestic enterprises.  What can be argued, however, 
is that many of the governments of individual African states allowed corruption and 
mismanagement to squander what potential benefits could have been achieved before 
the MFA was dismantled.  For example, when the South African government took the 
step of imposing its own quotas on Chinese textile imports, these imports duly 
dropped by around 35 per cent, but aggregate imports in these areas only marginally 
decreased.  Imposing the quotas without simultaneously establishing either direct 
support of local enterprise or a more efficient and transparent business environment 
has meant that countries such as Pakistan and Vietnam, rather than local 
manufacturers, have instead filled the gap in the market created by the quotas imposed 
against China.
38
 
 
For decades, African governments have been calling for a focus on trade and 
investment, rather than a reliance on a flawed aid system.  But, fifty years after 
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decolonization, insidious corruption and bad governance within African states are 
undermining development, just as much as the unfair terms of trade imposed on them 
by the more powerful actors of the West.  Some of the policies that have been enacted 
appear to provide little benefit to ordinary African citizens.  With their tiny domestic 
markets, it is easy to question what many African governments hope to gain by 
adopting high trade barriers.  Collier gives one reason – because they are key sources 
of corruption.  On the grand scale, governments can bestow protection on companies 
that have either given bribes for the privilege, or are owned by those who happen to 
be related to the key members of the governing party.  On the level of petty 
corruption, becoming a customs officer provides daily opportunities to engage in 
bribe-taking, and can prove extremely lucrative.
39
   
 
Members of Mozambican Civil Society Organisations have criticized China for its 
weak environmental and social requirements, its lack of human rights protections and 
its policy of non-interference.  They conclude: ‘The result has been dictators 
maintaining power, centralising wealth, and avoiding true development.’40  Yet these 
conclusions beg the question – where does the culpability ultimately lie?  When 
necessary, China and its state-backed MNCs are perfectly capable of working within 
the rule of law, at least to the (occasionally dubious) standards of the average western 
company.  In the example of the better-regulated and better-governed South Africa, 
Chinese MNCs have had little difficulty abiding by the rules and working within the 
law.  When Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf was elected president in Liberia,  she threw out the 
unfavourable terms of an iron ore deal with the Indian conglomerate, Mittal, and 
renegotiated a better one.  She also began a review of the terms granted to Chinese 
investors.
41
  The MPLA government in Angola surprised its Chinese partners in 
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March 2007 when it reversed the decision to award Sinopec the right to construct the 
oil refinery in Lobito.  Angolan officials complained that the facility was only aimed 
at supplying the Chinese market and stated that they were unwilling to be locked into 
long term supply contracts.
42
  This demonstrates that African politicians are not 
without influence over the actions of these great or rising powers when operating 
within their own borders.  Indeed, the longer-term possibility of a shift to a multi-
polar world could give rise to an element of competition from which African 
governments could benefit.  When the Chinese expressed an interest in establishing an 
economic zone in Mauritius, it was initially designed to fulfil some of China’s 
‘restructuring’ aims – moving some polluting sunset industries across to a new 
industrial hub in Mauritius.  After negotiations with the Mauritian government, 
however, the design was changed to a far more service- and technology-based city, 
with the light industry aspect outweighed by an emphasis on higher value-added 
investors.
43
  The government had not lost sight of the overall impact of the 
development for the whole country, with much of it being dependent on tourism.  By 
focusing on the overall interests of the population, the Mauritian government had 
succeeded in achieving a development of potentially substantial benefit for the 
citizens of that country.  This can be compared with the example of the establishment 
of an export-processing zone in Madagascar in the late 1990s.  Good economic 
policies enabled firms to become cost-competitive, and the provisions of the AGOA, 
enacted in 2000, came at just the right time for these Madagascan firms to take 
advantage of its provisions.  From an almost standing start, there was a rapid and huge 
growth in employment, with 300,000 jobs being created in the zone ‘almost 
overnight’.44  Unfortunately, the Madagascan people soon became victims of an all-
too-common example of appalling African governance.  When President Ratsiraka 
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lost the election in December 2001, he refused to step down, and blockaded the 
Madagascan port of Toamasina in order to unseat his rival, Marc Ravalomanana.  
This economic strangulation continued for eight months, during which time the export 
processing zone suffered serious damage.  Collier recalls the manager of an American 
garments firm witnessing the former president’s attempt to destroy the economy of his 
own country with disbelief, saying, ‘If it’s like that, then count us out.  We’ll stick to 
Asia’.45  
 
Again, China comes in for criticism from African commentators for their involvement 
in illegal logging in Zambezia province, Mozambique.  Further investigation, 
however, demonstrates the way that this involvement is only made possible through 
the collusion of the Mozambican government.  Justica Ambiental (Friends of the 
Earth Mozambique) explains that a checkpoint to monitor logging in the province 
concentrates on villagers with small amounts of timber, while those operators with 
links to politicians are not detained or checked.  Legislation stipulated that the main 
commercial species of logs had to be processed before export – most of which were 
being exported to China.  In complicity with the logging industry, the government has 
now added a special regulation which reclassifies the timber and allows their export 
as logs.  This in turn undermines local industry and transfers the possible value-added 
benefits to China.  The conclusion of Justica Ambiental is that China is facilitating 
illegal logging and obstructing sustainable development in the area, but the fact 
remains that if the government did not pursue corrupt relations with the logging 
industry, and passed legislation with the benefit of all Mozambicans in mind, China 
would have far fewer opportunities to exploit.   
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Corruption also plays a crucial role in the problem of Chinese counterfeiting in 
African markets.  Not only are laws to prohibit this practice ineffectually policed, 
there is also evidence to show that some corrupt politicians have a vested interest in 
maintaining the situation.
46
  In addition to this, the infrastructure – both physical and 
bureaucratic – necessary to facilitate business activities is severely compromised 
through inept or corrupt governance.  Despite huge gas and coal reserves, Nigeria can 
only manage to generate around half of the power needed to meet domestic demand.  
In February 2007, Nigeria announced that its power generation had dropped by almost 
60 per cent, despite the government’s claim to have invested over US$2 billion in the 
sector in the previous six years.
47
 
 
Conclusions 
In a distorted reflection of the Cold War, Africa once again runs the risk of being 
caught in the crossfire of the competing agendas of East and West.  This time the 
terms of the debate are centred on economic national interest and, crucially, one of the 
parties is not driven by the need for ideological evangelizing.  The rise of China has 
presented both obstacles and opportunities in Africa’s quest for growth.  It is 
impossible to assess the impact of China’s growth in Africa in any uniform way, 
largely due to the fact that diverse countries, and diverse sectors within countries, 
have experienced very different challenges in relation to China’s direct and indirect 
pressures.  The push for influence from both the Washington Consensus and the 
Beijing Consensus has given African statesmen and women a measure of influence 
over their own destinies.  Concern over these competing influences has, however, cast 
a spotlight on the fact that neither agenda will provide Africa with a definitive path to 
development.  Any benefit offered by China’s increased involvement on the continent 
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is contingent upon there being a sufficiently transparent and efficient government and 
bureaucracy in place to oversee it.  Although it is argued that it is this very system that 
the influence of Beijing would threaten, the competing agendas of Washington policy 
makers have also failed to secure it.  China’s role as development partner is likely to 
follow the pattern set by Washington.  Trade preferences and aid programmes will 
only be furthered in as far as they meet a donor’s interests – and no significant 
assistance will be offered by either power in sectors of the economy which may 
compromise donor interests. 
 
The renewed element of competition which has been introduced onto the development 
agenda ought to provide African governments with some degree of autonomy in the 
international sphere, but it also increases their responsibility.  If Africa is to capitalize 
on this limited window of opportunity, it needs a generation of leaders and 
parliamentarians who are prepared to build an environment conducive to investment 
and to the support of local industry.  If countries across the continent continue to be 
blighted by the scourge of corruption, infrastructure will be undermined as funds are 
channelled away from its improvement.  Bureaucracy will continue to act as a brake, 
rather than a facilitator for growth, and the competing influence of the US and China 
on the continent will remain academic for Africa’s people while governments provide 
an environment which allows either country to harvest what it can from Africa with 
little regard to the citizens of the continent.   
 
The small chance offered by the newly introduced element of competition between 
America’s and China’s development agendas means that, despite their ultimate focus 
on their own national interest, these powerful donor states might be more inclined to 
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offer some compromises to recipient governments in order to secure these same 
national interests.  This unique opportunity means that there are more chances to 
bargain and potentially more gains to be had from the development paths offered by 
either power.  And yet, regardless of this, some African governments might choose to 
ensure that their citizens continue to benefit from neither.
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